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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
DENNY LEE MOORE, : Case No. 20061147-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(2002). Appellant Denny Lee Moore was convicted of reckless possession of an 
incendiary device, a second degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 
(2003). The judgment is attached as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred when it failed to declare a mistrial after the 
prosecutor made repeated references to irrelevant matters, including the dangers of 
explosives to children and neighbors and in the hands of terrorists. 
Standard of Review: "The trial court's rulings on whether the prosecutor's conduct 
merits a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Fixel, 945 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotations and citation omitted); see also Chapman 
v. Uintah County, 2003 UT App 383, f28, 81 P.3d 761 (applying abuse-of-discretion 
standard to issue of relevance) (cite omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
The issue on appeal was preserved in the record at 199:38, 52, 105-06, 202-03, 
220, 223-24. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following rules are pertinent to the issue on appeal and attached hereto as 
Addendum B: Utah R. Evid. 401 and 402 (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On July 28, 2004, the state filed an information against Moore for one count of 
possession of an incendiary device. (R. 1-2). On March 9, 2006, the court conducted a 
preliminary hearing and bound the case over for trial. (R. 70-71). 
On August 17, 2006, the court presided over a jury trial in the case. (See R. 199). 
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Moore guilty as charged. (R. 162). On 
December 11, 2006, the trial court sentenced Moore to a suspended prison term and 
ordered probation for 36 months. (R. 185-88). On December 15, 2006, Moore filed a 
notice of appeal. (R. 189). The appeal is timely. Utah R. App. P. 3 & 4 (2006). Moore 
is not incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state presented the following evidence at trial. On July 14, 2004, two agents, 
Officers Olive and Jones-Williams, went to Denny Moore's house after receiving 
information from Ronald McGuffee and Angela Moore that Moore was in possession of 
dynamite. (R. 199:32, 34, 68). They went to the door, and when Moore answered, they 
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asked, "Do you have any dynamite in the house." (R. 199:36, 86). Moore said he did. 
fid.) The officers asked Moore to show the dynamite to them. (R. 199:39). Moore led 
them to a cellar in the backyard and said, "It looks like someone broke into it." (R. 
199:39-40, 87). 
The door was unlocked so the officers and Moore went into the cellar. It was 
dark. (R. 199:40). Jones had a flashlight. (R. 199:40-41). Moore indicated to an empty 
spot on the cellar floor and said, "Well, this is where the dynamite was." (R. 199:41). 
Nothing was there. (R. 199:41). One of the officers then noticed a box on the ground 
and they requested permission to look inside. (R. 199:41, 89). Moore gave permission. 
(R. 199:41, 89). Olive borrowed some latex gloves and reached into the box and felt a 
stick of soft-gel dynamite. (R. 199:42-43). Olive asked, "What is this?" Moore 
acknowledged "that it was dynamite." (R. 199:43). Olive asked, "Well, where is the 
rest?" Moore did not have a clear answer. He said "maybe fsome people had taken it.'" 
(R. 199:43). 
There were two sticks of dynamite. (R. 199:47; see also 199:102, State's Exhibits 
1, 3). Olive testified that the sticks were "sweating," meaning they were emanating an 
explosive liquid substance onto the concrete floor. (R. 199:46, 100). The condition made 
the explosives more dangerous. (R. 199:100-01). 
Olive also discovered "det cord - detonation cord" next to the dynamite (R. 199: 
46-47, 89, 101, 103; State's Exhibits 6 and 11), and another agent found a box of "IRECO 
Number 8 blasting caps or detonators." (R. 199:102, 103, State's Exhibits 9 and 10). 
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According to Olive, when the dynamite was discovered Moore began to make 
ffmini statements" that someone brought the dynamite to his cellar to set him up, and he 
distanced himself from the discovery. (R. 199:44-45). Moore stated, "I don't know 
[how] they got here," "I did not put it here," and he claimed that Ronald McGuffee and 
Angela Moore set him up. (R. 199:48). 
Moore did not have a license or permit for explosive devices. (R. 199:48-49). 
Officers dispatched a bomb technician investigator to the area. (R. 199:49, 97; see 
also 199:49, 91 (indicating that an area around the house was cleared)). Investigator 
Montmorency testified that he transported the explosives to the Salt Lake County 
firearms range in Parley's Canyon where bunkers are located for the sheriffs office. (R. 
199:104). Some of the explosives were tested and detonated there. (R. 199:107-08). 
Montmorency testified that the dynamite, detonation cord, and the blasting caps 
detonated with "force and fire." (R. 199:108). "They all initiated as expected." (R. 
199:108). The remaining items were locked and secured in a bunker. (R. 199:109). 
Detective Bybee also assisted with the investigation. She interrogated Moore at 
the Sandy Police Department. (R. 199:118-19). Moore told Bybee that someone broke 
into the cellar a week earlier. (R. 199:122). Also, he claimed his ex-wife may have 
framed him with the recent explosives in the cellar. He stated that people "were wanting" 
to frame him. (R. 199:123, 130). 
Moore denied telling Olive that he had dynamite (R. 199:125). Moore told Bybee 
that he knew what dynamite was. (R. 199:126). He had belonged to a communications 
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unit for nuclear artillery in the military. (R. 199:137). Moore described finding dynamite 
near Utah Lake, marking it, and alerting authorities. (R. 199:126). 
After the state presented its case in chief, Moore presented evidence in his 
defense. He called Kelly Alvey to testify. (R. 199:145). Alvey is in the lumber, 
building, and hardware business and he also does mining and oil exploration. (Id.) He is 
licensed to use dynamite, and has used dynamite, blasting caps, and det cord in his 
businesses. (R. 199:146-47). 
Alvey testified that in 2004, he occasionally supplied building materials to Moore. 
(R. 199:151). In approximately July 2004, Alvey was transporting an unmarked box of 
dynamite on a truck that included materials for Moore. Alvey later became aware that 
someone had inadvertently unloaded the box of dynamite at Moore's house while 
unloading the materials. (R. 199:152-54). The dynamite belonged to Alvey and he did 
not intend to deliver it to Moore: that was a mistake. Alvey planned to go to Moore's 
house to pick up the explosives. (R. 199:155). 
Alvey identified State's Exhibits 1 and 7, which depicted the dynamite and 
unmarked box. He stated they were his. (R. 199:155-58). He did not recognize the det 
cord or box of blasting caps, although he testified he may have had caps on his vehicle on 
the day in July 2004 when he inadvertently left the box at Moore's house. (R. 199:156, 
159-60; see also R. 199:167-68). Alvey testified there are various stages for dynamite to 
sweat. (R. 199:166). He denied that he would transport sweating dynamite, but could 
not say for sure that the dynamite here was not his; that is, he believed it was his 
dynamite. (R. 199:163, 166). 
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At the close of the evidence, the parties presented argument. During closing 
argument, the prosecutor made reference to the dangers of explosives, where "kids blow 
their fingers off." (R. 199:202). Also, he stated, "we don't want these devices, not only 
falling into children's hands, we don't want them falling into terrorists' hands either. We 
don't want that to happen." (R. 199: 202-203). Defense counsel objected and the trial 
court struck the prosecutor's statement regarding terrorists or terrorism from the record 
and provided a curative instruction. (R. 199:203). The prosecutor also argued that 
recklessness included "the risk that you'll blow something up." (R. 199:220). 
After argument, defense counsel made a motion outside the jury's presence for a 
mistrial. (R. 199:223-24). He argued that the terrorism comment and the prosecutor's re-
ferences to the dangers posed to children improperly inflamed the jury's passions against 
the defense, running the risk that the jury would convict based on fear and danger. (Id.) 
The trial court denied the motion. (R. 199:225-26 (see Addendum C, hereto)). The jury 
convicted as charged. (R. 199:229). The court ordered Moore to a suspended prison term 
and placed him on probation for 36 months. (R. 185-88). Moore is not incarcerated. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Over defense counsel's objections, the prosecutor asked questions and made 
statements at trial that went to the dangers of an incendiary device. The questions 
focused on issues such as children and explosives, improper storage of explosives, and 
explosives and terrorists. The prosecutor's tactics violated rules 401 and 402, Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Specifically, the prosecutor sought to inject irrelevant information into the 
trial to inflame the jury and to cause the jury to convict out of fear. The evidence had no 
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bearing on any element of the charged offense, and it did not make the fact that Moore 
denied illegal possession of explosives more or less probable. The evidence was 
inadmissible, it prejudiced Moore, and it denied him a fair trial in the matter. Moore 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction in this case and remand the 
case for a new trial, excluding the inadmissible evidence and references. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE A 
MISTRIAL AFTER THE PROSECUTOR MADE REPEATED 
REFERENCES TO IRRELEVANT MATTERS REGARDING THE 
DANGERS OF EXPLOSIVES, 
A. THE RULES AND CASE LAW PROHIBIT THE PROSECUTION FROM 
MAKING REFERENCE TO IRRELEVANT AND INFLAMMATORY 
MATTERS AT TRIAL. 
Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that "relevant evidence" is that which 
has a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401 (2006); see also State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, p i , 44 P.3d 
805. "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402 (2002); see 
also id. at 403 (although relevant, evidence may be excluded if it is unduly prejudicial or 
will mislead the jury). 
?,[T]he standard for determining the relevancy of the evidence is Very low,f and 
even evidence with the '"slightest probative value'" is relevant." Martin, 2002 UT 34, Tf34 
(quoting State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, ffi[12 & 16, 973 P.2d 404 (quoting Edward L. 
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Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law 4-2 (1996))). However, where 
evidence "has no probative value to a fact at issue, it is irrelevant and inadmissible under 
rule 402." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,1J13; Utah R. Evid. 402; State v. Smedlev. 2003 UT App 
79,fl5,67P.3dl005. 
In State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, 108 P.3d 730, the Utah Supreme Court considered 
whether evidence - showing that defendant had made fraudulent credit card purchases 
both before and after his wife's murder - would be relevant to the state's conspiracy 
theory in a case against the defendant for aggravated murder and conspiracy to commit 
aggravated murder. Id at ^[22-23. The court concluded it was. It stated, 
[T]he evidence of how [defendant] concealed his payments to [a co-defendant] 
corroborated [the co-defendant's] account of the events and therefore ultimately 
supported the State's allegation that [defendant] had conspired with Taylor and 
[the co-defendant] to murder his wife. The evidence of [defendant's] fraudulent 
purchases made the existence of a conspiracy and the actions taken in furtherance 
thereof more probable than if the evidence were not admitted. 
Id. at f23. The evidence went to the elements of the offense for conspiracy. See also 
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, Tf22, 993 P.2d 837 (stating that unless the evidence at issue 
"tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime charged . . . it is irrelevant and 
should be excluded" pursuant to Rule 402); State v. Rees, 2004 UT App 51,1f4, 88 P.3d 
359 (determining that evidence essential to proving intent is relevant); State v. 
McDonald, 2005 UT App 86, Tfl2, 110 P.3d 149 (stating that evidence going to state of 
mind constitutes "a defining element of the crimes charged, and is clearly relevant"). 
As more fully set forth below, the prosecutor made reference to irrelevant matters 
here. That was improper under Rules 401 and 402. (See infra, Argument B, herein). 
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The Law Concerning Mistrials for Prosecutorial Misconduct. 
A trial court has discretion to grant a mistrial or a new trial, and an appellate court 
will not disturb the trial court's ruling unless it appears that the trial court has abused its 
discretion to the prejudice of the defendant. See State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 265-66, 
276 (Utah 1998); see also State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Utah 
R. Crim. P. 24(a) (2006) (stating that a defendant may be entitled to a new trial "if there 
is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a 
party"). 
In determining whether a defendant may be entitled to a mistrial or a new trial due 
to prosecutorial misconduct, Utah appellate courts have applied a two-part test. The test 
examines the following: 
[1] [whether t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call to the attention of the 
jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and, 
[2] if so, under the circumstances of the particular case, whether the error is 
substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its 
absence, there would have been a more favorable result." 
State v. Basta, 966 P.2d 260, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (cite omitted); State v. Reed, 
2000 UT 68, t l 8 , 8 P.3d 1025; State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); see also 
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 344 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("A comment by a prosecutor 
during closing argument that the jury consider matters outside the evidence is 
prosecutorial misconduct"). 
The first step is met when the prosecutor references matters meant to invoke the 
sympathies, passions and fears of the jury and when the prosecutor misstates application 
of the law to the facts. See ABA Stds for Crim. Justice: Prosecution Function and 
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Defense Function, §§ 3-5.8 to 3-5.9 (3d ed. 1993). Specifically, a prosecutor is 
prohibited from using argument calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the 
jury. See ABA Stds Crim. Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, § 3-
5.8(c). A prosecutor is prohibited from asking jurors to inject themselves into the case. 
See Com, v. Cherry, 378 A.2d 800, 803 (Pa. 1977) (counsel may not make statements 
appealing to the emotions of the jury); see also State v. Leon, 945 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Ariz. 
1997) (stating that a prosecutor's comments must be "based on facts the jury is entitled to 
find from the evidence and not on extraneous matters that were not or could not be 
received in evidence"). A prosecutor is "precluded from arguing matters not in evi-
dence." See State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989); Palmer, 860 P.2d at 344. 
Indeed, a prosecutors obligation is to present the relevant facts, and to ensure 
justice: 
[T]he [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, 
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution 
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a 
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is 
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness 
and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one. 
Bergerv.U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Also, 
[a] criminal trial is a neutral arena wherein both sides place evidence for the jury's 
consideration; the role of counsel in closing argument is to assist the jury 
in analyzing that evidence, not to obscure the jury's view with personal opinion, 
emotion, andnonrecord evidence^] 
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Johns v. State, 832 So.2d 959, 963 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (cite omitted); ABA Stds for 
Crim. Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function, § 3-5.8(d) (a prosecutor may 
not "divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence"). Thus, "[state-
ments which suggest that a jury has an obligation to convict a defendant on some basis 
other than solely on the evidence before it are improper and beyond the broad latitude 
allowed in closing argument." State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 1986). 
The second part of the prosecutorial-misconduct test refers to the prejudice 
analysis. See State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 335 (Utah 1991). When a prosecutor makes 
comments to incite the jurors' passions, prejudices, and sympathies, those comments 
have a substantial impact on a defendant's case, resulting in prejudice. The comments 
introduce irrelevant and irrational information into the decision making process. 
"[WJhere evidence [is] shown to have supported only conjectural inferences which 
had little probative value, or where no evidence was adduced that showed that a fact had 
any causal connection with the [crime charged], reversal may be appropriate on grounds 
that the improperly admitted evidence could only have served to confuse and mislead the 
jury or to prejudice the outcome of the case." State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987) (cite omitted; internal quotations omitted). 
This Court will reverse a conviction based on the prosecutor's injection of 
improper matters at trial "[i]f the prejudice is such that there is a reasonable likelihood 
the jury would have reached a more favorable result absent the comments." Reed, 2000 
UT 68, Tfl8 (cite omitted); State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997); see also 
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Troy, 688 P.2d at 486 ("If proof of a defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or 
remark will not be presumed prejudicial.") (cite omitted). 
Pursuant to Rules 401 and 402 and case law, the prosecutor's references at trial to 
irrelevant and inflammatory matters were improper, as further explained below. See 
infra, Argument B., herein. Also, the references were prejudicial. See infra, Argument 
C, herein. 
B. THE PROSECUTOR MADE IMPROPER COMMENTS AND 
REFERENCES AT TRIAL. 
In this case, the prosecutor injected irrelevant information into the trial. 
Specifically, the prosecutor made references to children (see R. 199: 38, 52; see also 199: 
165), and the dangers of explosives (R. 199:160 (referencing "kids" "getting their fingers 
blown off by blasting caps"), 165). He asked Officer Olive to state how many children 
were around the house when officers discovered dynamite, and he inquired into their 
ages. (R. 199:38 (there were three children, ages four to six, approximately)). The 
statements were intended to suggest that possessing explosives is dangerous to children. 
(See R. 199:52). Also, the prosecutor made references to the government's safe storage 
of explosives, thereby insinuating that safe storage - or lack thereof- is somehow 
relevant to the possession charge. (See R. 199:105-06, 113; see_also 199:164). 
While the defense stipulated that items discovered in Moore's cellar were not 
stored in compliance with state or federal law (R. 199:106), the prosecutor's references 
went beyond that stipulation to suggest dangerous conditions and to create a sense of fear 
in the jury beyond the charge for simple possession. (See R. 199:105-06, 113). 
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After the parties presented evidence to the jury, the prosecutor made further 
references in closing argument to "kids blow[ing] their fingers off1 and explosives 
"falling into children's hands" and "falling into terrorists' hands." (R. 199:202; see also 
199:220 (suggesting that recklessness does not go to possession, but rather goes to the 
risk that "you'll blow something up")). Again, the several statements and insinuations 
were intended to create fear in the minds of jurors, to inflame their passions, and to cause 
them to convict out of fear for terrorists or explosives harming children or 
neighborhoods. (See R. 199:223-24). The prosecutor's comments and references were 
not relevant to the possession charge. 
To explain, for the offense of possession, the prosecutor was required to prove that 
Moore "knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesse[d] or controlled] an explosive, 
chemical, or incendiary device," including "dynamite," "detcord," or "blasting caps." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306(l)(a)(i), (3) (2003). The elements for the offense are 
straightforward. They include (i) a mental state, (ii) possession, and (iii) an explosive 
device. Id. 
To that end, the element of "recklessly" goes to the mental state for the defendant. 
Id. Where the prosecutor was required to prove one of three mental states (recklessly, 
knowingly or intentionally), the jury had to decide whether Moore intentionally or 
knowingly possessed explosives; or whether he was subjectively aware of such 
possession but consciously disregarded it for the reckless mental state. See State v. 
Robinson, 2003 UT App 1, | 6 & n.2, 63 P.3d 105 (for a reckless mental state, "the 
determination to be made is whether the defendant was subjectively 'aware of but 
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consciously disregarded' the risk his actions posed") (cite omitted); State v. Martinez, 
2000 UT App 320,112 n.5, 14 P.3d 114 ("Liability for criminal recklessness . . . 
require[s] actual knowledge or awareness and thus turns on the defendants subjective 
mental state") (internal citations omitted), affd, 2002 UT 80, 52 P.3d 1276; State v. 
Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1308-09 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
However, in this case, the prosecutor seemed to believe that "recklessly" should be 
used in a different sense, i.e., to show that it is reckless to have explosives around child-
ren, available to terrorists, or improperly stored. (See R. 199:38, 52, 105-06, 160-61, 
164-65, 202-03, 220); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112(1) (2003) (defining 
misdemeanor "reckless endangerment" as requiring proof that defendant recklessly 
engaged in conduct that created "a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to 
another person"). 
That is nonsensical for the possession offense at issue here. Under the prosecutor's 
interpretation, even a wholesaler or licensed distributor of explosives would be in 
"reckless[]" criminal possession if children were in the vicinity or if he sold explosives to 
an individual with devious intentions. Yet those facts do not relate to elements of the 
offense. The term "recklessly" in Section 76-10-306 does not go to the safe-keeping or 
the hazardous conditions of the explosives. It goes to the defendant's mental state, i.e., 
whether defendant was aware, but disregarded, that he possessed explosives. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-306(3). 
In short, the prosecutor misunderstood the elements for the offense and made 
repeated references to irrelevant matters, i.e., the reckless storage of and access to the 
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explosives. Evidence that explosives were dangerous around children, neighborhoods 
and terrorists did not relate to proving the elements for actual possession. The evidence 
did not go to the existence of any fact pertinent to the elements and it did not make 
"possession" of explosives more or less probable. The references and evidence were 
irrelevant to the offense. See Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, |13; Utah R. Evid. 402. 
They were meant to invoke the sympathies, passions and fears of the jury and to 
confuse the jury as to what the elements were. See Palmer, 860 P.2d at 344 ("A comment 
by a prosecutor during closing argument that the jury consider matters outside the 
evidence is prosecutorial misconduct"); (see also, supra, pages 9-12). 
That was improper and inadmissible. See ABA Stds Crim. Justice: Prosecution 
Function and Defense Function, § 3-5.8(c), (d) (stating a prosecutor is prohibited from 
making certain improper arguments to the jury); Cherry, 378 A.2d at 803 (counsel may 
not make statements appealing to the emotions of the jury). 
C. THE IMPROPER REFERENCES AND COMMENTS WERE PREJUDICIAL. 
Preservation 
Although defendant did not object to each improper reference that the prosecutor 
made during witness examinations at trial (see R. 199:160-61, 164, 165), the motion for a 
mistrial at the end of trial was sufficient to take into account the prosecutor's repeated 
indiscretions. (See R. 199:223-24 (objecting to the cumulative references)). Indeed, the 
defense made a motion for a mistrial due to the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial 
misconduct. (R. 199:223-24). 
Once the defendant made the motion, the prosecutor and the trial court addressed 
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the merits of defendant's claims and treated them as timely. (See R. 199:225 (requiring a 
response from the prosecutor); 199:225-26 (ruling on the merits of the cumulative matters 
and not finding waiver)); see also State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1992) 
(ruling that whatever the requirements of the rule, a trial judge may choose not to address 
timeliness and may proceed to consider the merits of a claim, thereby supporting preser-
vation) (citing State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991)); State v. Johnson, 821 
P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991) (stating if the trial court has addressed the merits, a waiver 
or timeliness argument is weakened); State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Utah 1993) 
(stating the trial court must rule on an issue before it can be raised on appeal), superseded 
on other grounds as recognized in State v. Hammond, 2001 UT 92, ^ [20, 34 P.3d 773. 
The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial. (See R. 199:266, Addendum C, 
hereto). Thus, the cumulative effect of the errors may be assessed on appeal. 
The Curative Instruction 
Also, where the trial court provided a curative instruction after the prosecutor 
made improper references in closing argument (R. 199:203), that is not a cure-all. The 
Utah Supreme Court has ruled that curative instructions "are a settled and necessary 
feature of our judicial process and one of the most important tools by which a court may 
remedy errors at trial." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 271 (Utah 1998); see also State v. 
Longshaw, 961 P.2d 925, 929-30 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). The supreme court also has 
recognized that curative instructions "are not always sufficient to avoid the potential 
prejudice to the defendant. fState v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935, 937 (Utah 1988)]. The 
potential for prejudice is greatest when the circumstantial facts are closely related to the 
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issue the jury must ultimately decide." State v. Wetzel 868 P.2d 64, 69 (Utah 1993). 
"This court acknowledges that curative instructions are not without defect or limitation." 
Harmon, 956 P.2d at 273 n.9; see also id. at 278 (Durham, J., concurring) (it is 
significantly likely that "our collective confidence in the curative instruction as a valuable 
'tool' is not substantiated by reality"). 
In State v. Leon, 945 P.2d 1290 (Ariz. 1997), defendant was charged with and 
convicted of drug distribution. On appeal, defendant argued prosecutorial misconduct, 
where the prosecutor attempted to place the prestige of the government behind his case, 
and he made references during closing arguments to police reports not in evidence. Id. at 
1291-92. The defendant objected to the improper statements, and the trial judge 
sustained the objections to statements in closing argument, reprimanded the prosecutor, 
and provided a curative instruction to the jury. Id. at 1292. After the jury began 
deliberations, the defense requested a mistrial, which the trial court denied. Id On 
appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed the case and stated the following: 
The [prosecuting] attorney continued to violate standards of appropriate conduct at 
the conclusion of the trial. Although advocates are ordinarily given wide latitude 
in closing argument, their comments must still be "based on facts the jury is 
entitled to find from the evidence and not on extraneous matters that were not or 
could not be received in evidence.". . . Here, nothing was admitted pertaining to 
previous drug transactions, which alone should have precluded the state from 
mentioning them in closing. . . . Similarly, by implying that police reports 
contained other "bad acts," the deputy county attorney referred to matters not in 
evidence and presumably inadmissible under Rule 404, Ariz.R.Evid. This 
misconduct was particularly egregious considering that the court had earlier 
excluded statements regarding a prior incident because they had not been formally 
disclosed in advance of trial. 
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Id. at 1293 (internal cites omitted). The court remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 
1264. 
In this case, after the prosecutor made reference in closing argument to children 
and explosives and explosives falling into "terrorists' hands," defense counsel objected 
and the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the terrorism references in 
deliberations. (R. 199:202-03). The court specifically considered the prosecutor's 
statement going to terrorism to be inappropriate. (See R. 199:225-26). However, at that 
point, the prosecutor had planted the seed, and the damage was done. Any confidence 
that the curative instruction fixed the problem "is not substantiated by reality." Harmon, 
956 P.2d at 278 (Durham, J., concurring). Since the law recognizes that a curative 
instruction is not a cure-all, see id. at 273, the analysis here does not end with the curative 
instruction. This Court may assess prejudice. See e.g., id. at 273 (recognizing that error 
may be assessed for prejudice). 
Prejudice 
"If the prejudice is such that there is a reasonable likelihood the jury would have 
reached a more favorable result absent the comments, we will reverse." State v. Pearson, 
943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997). When the prosecutor uses improper references and 
arguments to incite the jurors' passions, prejudices and sympathies, the improper matters 
have a substantial impact on a defendant's case. The argument introduces irrelevant and 
irrational information into the decision making process. See Andreason, 718 P.2d at 402 
(stating that improper references are "beyond the broad latitude allowed in closing 
argument"). 
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Given the evidence presented at trial in this case, the prejudice analysis here turns 
on the reasonable-doubt standard. Under the reasonable-doubt standard fl[t]he [state] has 
the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Reyes, 
2005 UT 33,1f37, 116 P.3d 305. "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves 
you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that 
we know with absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law does not require proof that 
overcomes every possible doubt." Id. The proof for a criminal conviction must be 
powerful, l 
In this case, the evidence going to the elements raised doubt about guilt. Specifi-
cally, while the state presented evidence that Moore allowed officers to enter and search 
his cellar and discover explosives (see R. 199:36-39, 86-87), there is also evidence that 
Moore believed he was showing officers explosives that belonged to Alvey. (R. 199:41 
(indicating Moore believed explosives were in a different place in the cellar), 43 (indica-
ting Moore thought the explosives had been taken); see also R. 199:87, 88). And there is 
evidence that the explosives actually discovered in the cellar were a surprise to Moore 
and did not belong to him. (R. 199:40 (indicating someone may have broken into the 
cellar), 41 (indicating Moore did not know about the explosives that were actually located 
1 Moore is not advocating for a prejudice analysis that considers whether the error 
is "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 
1986) (cite omitted). That analysis is reserved for errors that deprive a defendant of a 
constitutional right. See id. Also, it requires the party that benefited from the error (the 
prosecution) to show "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the 
verdict (or sentence) obtained." State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 359, 377 (Utah 1993) 
(cites omitted). 
Moore's analysis simply recognizes that for guilt, the state's proof must be beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
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in the cellar), 44-45, 68, 123, 130 (indicating Moore believed others had "set him up"), 
48, 90, 122). 
In addition, Moore presented evidence to support that the dynamite belonged to 
Alvey and was inadvertently left on his property. (R. 199:152-154 (Alvey became aware 
that his dynamite was left at Moore's house when he delivered supplies there), 156-58, 
166). 
That evidence raised reasonable doubt with respect to Moore's mental state in 
purportedly possessing the explosives. That is, where the explosives belonged to Alvey 
and Alvey intended to retrieve them, Moore did not possess the explosives either 
recklessly, knowingly or intentionally. Also, where others may have been involved in a 
"set up" against Moore, Moore had no involvement in possessing explosives. Thus, 
absent the overlay of fear and danger injected by the prosecutor (see supra, Argument B., 
herein), jurors likely would have doubted Moore's guilt for reckless, knowing, or 
intentional possession of explosives. 
Likewise, the evidence raised a reasonable doubt that Moore had constructive or 
actual possession of the explosives. For constructive possession, the state was required to 
prove that the items were under Moore's dominion and control. See State v. Fox, 709 
P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). "Knowledge and ability to possess" are insufficient to 
establish constructive possession unless the defendant intends to "make use of that 
knowledge and ability." IdL at 319. Also, it is not enough that Moore lived in the house, 
particularly where evidence also supported that others had access to the property, or that 
the explosives belonged to another. (See R. 199:40 (indicating someone may have 
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broken into the cellar), 44-45, 48, 68, 122, 123, 130 (indicating Moore believed others 
had "set him up"), 90, 152-154 (Alvey became aware that his dynamite was left at 
Moore's house when he delivered supplies there), 166); see also Fox, 709 P.2d at 319; 
State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,1fljl2-13, 985 P.2d 911 (where the facts support that the 
items belonged to someone else, the state must also show that defendant intended to use 
the items "as his own" to support constructive possession); State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 
1388 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing defendant did not have sole access to items). 
In this case, the evidence was susceptible to alternative interpretations. It was 
sufficient to raise doubt about Moore's actual or constructive possession of the items. 
There is a greater likelihood that the jury was improperly influenced by the prosecutor's 
misleading statements and references at trial. See Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87 (finding that 
the prosecutorial misconduct likely influenced the jury). The prosecutor's tactics in 
misleading the jury should not be reinforced with a finding of harmless error. The error 
was prejudicial requiring reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues in this case may be readily resolved under established Utah law. See 
Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). Moore respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
conviction for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this £5^ day of _jAo^_ , 2007. 
dzM 
Lincfa M. Jones 
Stephen Howard 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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UTAH R. EVID. 401 and 402 (2006) 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence'' means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrele-
vant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. 
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
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1 Any response from the State? 
2 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes, Your Honor. As I indicated 
3 at the sidebar the Homeland Security Bill is part of what 
4 this statute is, it was enacted after 9-11. We can't operate 
5 with juries outside of a vacuum. And we do have a recklessly 
6 provision of mens rea which considers risk. It's not risk to 
7 be risky. It's risk of the behavior involved in this 
8 particular, inherently dangerous enterprise. I didn't say 
9 Mr. Moore was a terrorist. All I said was that the potential 
10 for these materials and the reasons why we license and 
11 control them is for obvious reasons. Terrorism being one. 
12 Children being another. Proper licensing for safety and 
13 things like that. That's all relevant argument. 
14 And, otherwise, why even argue the law with respect 
15 to these cases because they wouldn't make any sense. We 
16 would be operating in a vacuum and I don't believe that's 
17 what the legislative intent was when they enacted these 
18 provisions, and certainly, the inferences to be drawn from 
19 why we are so concerned about these types of devices being in 
20 anybody's possession I think is highly relevant to the case. 
21 THE COURT: Thank you. 
22 Anything else, Mr. Howard? 
23 MR. HOWARD: No, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. You know, counsel, I felt like 
25 J the statement relating to terrorist or terrorism was 
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1 inappropriate. I immediately cautioned the jury with regard 
2 to that. I struck that from the record. They were advised 
3 in the instructions that they were to disregard that, and I 
4 have the firm belief that if there was any impropriety with 
5 regard to that, that that was corrected and we did everything 
6 that was appropriate and possible under those circumstances. 
7 Secondly, with regard to any cumulative effect, I 
8 think that Mr. Christensen, the State's entitled to make 
9 logical inferences, and I don't think that the bounds were 
10 exceeded with regard to those, and based on that I'm not 
11 going to grant a mistrial under those circumstances, but note 
12 that for the record, and I appreciate your raising the issue. 
13 Anything else we need to address, counsel? 
14 MR. CHRISTENSEN: Just the exhibits, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to have you, if you 
16 would, Mr. Howard and Mr. Christensen, if you'd both look at 
17 the exhibits, make sure that they're full and complete and 
18 we're in agreement as to what should go into the jury room 
19 and then we'll take those to the jury and I'll have the 
20 bailiff to do so. 
21 UNKNOWN: (Inaudible). 
22 THE COURT: Yeah, let's go ahead and take a look. 
23 Anything else we need to address other than the Exhibits, 
24 counsel? 
25 MR. HOWARD: No. 
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